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“A Peculiar Stampe of Our Owne”:
The Massachusetts Mint and the Battle
over Sovereignty, 1652–1691
jonathan edward barth
ESTABLISHED in 1652, the Massachusetts mint was aremarkably bold and unparalleled expression of de facto
colonial sovereignty. Then, as now, the authority to issue money
indicated political and economic self-determination, a preroga-
tive reserved for monarchs, princes, and independent states. In
1651, for instance, Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, listed “the
power to coyn Money” among the “Rights, which make the
Essence of Soveraignty.” The right to mint coins, Hobbes ar-
gued, “belongeth to the Common-wealth, that is to say, to the
Soveraign.”1
Across the mint’s thirty-year career, prominent political and
religious figures in Massachusetts Bay interpreted their colony’s
coining of silver not simply as an act of economic expediency
but as a gesture of political autonomy. Conflict erupted when
the officials of a restored English monarchy came to recog-
nize the effrontery of that second intention, which inaugurated
a transatlantic battle over sovereignty after 1660. The Mas-
sachusetts mint became a focal point in this contest because
the money suggested that the colony’s dominant political fac-
tion placed allegiance to Massachusetts above allegiance to En-
gland. This inversion of due fealty largely subsided following
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, after which the former po-
litical justification for having a colonial mint shortly dissipated,
1Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-
Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil (London, 1651), pp. 92, 129–30.
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thus closing one of the most politically turbulent chapters in
the colony’s history.
Remarkably little has been written about the Boston mint,
and that which has is largely antiquated, relegated mostly to
sources dating back to the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.2 No historical work has yet fully examined the thirty-
year dispute over the mint’s existence, a pitched battle not only
between Massachusetts and the English sovereign to which it
owed allegiance but within the colony as well. Many historians
have already detailed the empire’s efforts to win and main-
tain colonial allegiance after 1688, but little on this matter has
been written of the era preceding 1688, when colonial alle-
giance to England was sometimes far from given, especially in
Massachusetts Bay. The Boston mint—and the extraordinary
drama that unfolded from it—constitutes the most compelling
evidence available to historians that a prominent and outspo-
ken faction within the colony, before 1688, deemed themselves
politically independent from England.
In the opening years of the 1640s, as King Charles I
attempted to stave off Parliament’s bid to enhance its author-
ity, the Massachusetts Bay Colony plunged into a massive de-
flationary depression. Agricultural prices spiraled downward in
the summer of 1640, and silver coin all but disappeared from
the colony. As migration from England slowed to a trickle, so
did the inflow of money that had once sustained Massachusetts’
economy in the 1630s. “All our money was drained from us, and
cattle and all commodities grew very cheap,” John Winthrop
remarked several months into the depression; “the scarcity of
money made a great change in all commerce.”3
2Charles McLean Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History, 4 vols. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1934–38), 1:519; George Bancroft, History of the Col-
onization of the United States, vol. 1 (1834; 14th ed., Boston, 1848), p. 433; John
Gorham Palfrey, History of New England, vol. 2 (1860; rev. ed., Boston, 1876), p. 40.
3The Journal of John Winthrop, 1630–1649, ed. Richard S. Dunn and Laetitia
Yeandle (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 328, 339.
For more on the deflationary depression of the early 1640s, see Marion H. Gottfried,
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Although most rural settlers relied primarily on barter and
country produce to mediate economic exchanges, colonial mer-
chants required silver to purchase imported goods, linking the
economic health of the colony to the overall supply of coin.
Because there were no gold or silver mines in New England,
money had to come from abroad. Some arrived with new set-
tlers, but the main channel through which silver flowed was
a favorable balance of trade, whereby the value of exported
goods surpassed that of imported goods, with money making
up the balance. “So long as our ingate exceeds our outgate,”
the General Court cautioned in 1646, “the ballance . . . cann
leave us but little mony.”4
The Court’s call to improve the balance of trade, with the
explicit goal of returning silver to the specie-strapped colony,
met with dramatic success. Within a few years, Boston and
Salem merchants were exporting record quantities of cod and
lumber products across the Atlantic to the Iberian Penin-
sula and Wine Islands, for which, in part, they received large
sums of silver. By midcentury, this money-begetting trade also
extended to the Caribbean. As one New England almanac
writer rhymed in 1648, “Some silver mine, if any here doe
wish, they it may finde in the bellyes of our fish.”5 Given the
ready supply of lumber so near to hand, moreover, shipbuild-
ing, of small and large vessels alike, became another corner-
stone of New England’s emergent economy. “The general fear
of want of foreign commodities, now our money was gone,
set us on work to provide shipping of our own,” remarked
Winthrop.6 Freed from expending precious coin to employ
vessels built and owned abroad, merchants—and, by extension,
“The First Depression in Massachusetts,” New England Quarterly 9.4 (December
1936): 655–78; Margaret Ellen Newell, From Dependency to Independence: Economic
Revolution in Colonial New England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 52–
55.
4Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England,
ed. Nathaniel Bradstreet Shurtleff, 5 vols. (Boston, 1853–54), 3:92.
5Samuel Danforth, An Almanac for the Year of Our Lord 1648 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1648), page for December.
6Winthrop, Journal, p. 353.
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the colony—quickly achieved a remarkable degree of economic
independence.7
By midcentury the Bay Colony had undergone a radical com-
mercial transformation, culminating in the establishment of a
mint house in Boston. On 26 May 1652, the Massachusetts
General Court directed that all foreign coin then circulating
within the colony be converted into new Massachusetts pieces
of one shilling, six pence, and three pence. By doing so, the
General Court reasoned, the colony’s inhabitants—chiefly mer-
chants and tradesmen—would finally enjoy a uniform currency
without having to handle irregular foreign monies of differing
weights and origins. The original stamp, as issued between June
and October 1652, was exceptionally simple: a mere “NE,” for
New England, on one side, and the denomination in Roman
numerals on the other (fig. 1).8
In October 1652 the General Court arranged for a new, more
comprehensive stamp, including, for the first time, a double
ring on both sides to discourage clippers from shaving silver
off the edges.9 On one face was a tree, encircled by the in-
scription “Massachusetts.” On the other, in the center, was
1652 in Arabic numbers, under which was the denomination in
Roman numerals and the inscription “NEW ENGLAND” and
“ANDOM,” for Anno Domini, circled within the coin’s outer
7Joseph A. Goldenberg, Shipbuilding in Colonial America (Charlottesville: Univer-
sity Press of Virginia, 1976), pp. 10–18; James E. McWilliams, Building the Bay Colony:
Local Economy and Culture in Early Massachusetts (Charlottesville: University of Vir-
ginia Press, 2007), pp. 54–55; and Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 83.
8Mass. Bay Records, 4.1:84–85. For secondary literature on the Massachusetts mint,
see Andrews, The Colonial Period, 1:493–94, 519, 2:59; Newell, From Dependency
to Independence, p. 116; Richard S. Dunn, Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop
Dynasty of New England, 1630–1717 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962),
pp. 100–101; Walter Breen’s Complete Encyclopedia of U.S. and Colonial Coins (New
York: Doubleday, 1988), pp. 11–18; and Viola Florence Barnes, The Dominion of
New England: A Study in British Colonial Policy (1923; repr. New York: Frederick
Ungar Publishing Co., 1960), pp. 149–52. In 1720 Edward Wigglesworth discussed
the mint in a pamphlet supporting Massachusetts paper currency: see his A Project
for the Emission of an Hundred Thousand Pounds of Province Bills (Boston, 1720),
pp. 11–12. The mint also receives prominent mention in Thomas Hutchinson, The
History of Massachusetts, from the First Settlement thereof in 1628, until the Year
1750, 2 vols. (Boston, 1764 and 1767; 3rd ed., Salem, Mass., 1795), 1:164–65.
9Mass. Bay Records, 4.1:104–5.
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Fig. 1.—A twelve-pence “NE” shilling, issued sometime between
June and October 1652. Image courtesy of Stack’s Bowers Galleries.
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edge (fig. 2). The species of tree varied throughout the mint’s
history: a willow tree, 1652–60; an oak tree, 1660–67; and a
pine tree, 1667–82.10 It was during this latter period that the
coins became known as “pine-tree shillings,” though they were
also denominated “Boston shillings” or “Bay shillings.”11
The founding of the mint in 1652 signified, first, the colony’s
tremendous economic growth in the latter half of the 1640s.
The design of the Bay shilling, centered as it was on a simple
tree, proudly celebrated the expanding shipbuilding industry,
the main source of the colony’s growing prosperity. The deci-
sion to stamp “New England” on the back of the coin, more-
over, testified to the economic dominance of Massachusetts Bay
throughout the region. By midcentury virtually all of New En-
gland received its European goods via the merchants of Boston,
and they ultimately handled more Bay shillings than any other
class in New England. The Boston merchant, in a very real
way, was New England, and so was his money.
But there was also an additional, political component to the
coin, and it signified the degree to which Massachusetts leaders
thought themselves empowered to conduct their own affairs.
By neglecting to acknowledge English authority on the face of
its money, the Massachusetts government in effect asserted its
own sovereignty. And the coinage was not the only act that cir-
cumvented English authority. That same year, 1652, the Gen-
eral Court decreed that all settlers take an oath of fidelity to the
colonial government, with, again, no mention whatsoever of any
political ties to England.12 Parliament had executed Charles I
three years earlier, and Cromwell would not become Lord Pro-
tector until the following year; Massachusetts’ leaders, in the
meantime, took advantage of the political ambiguities and as-
sumed one of the key defining characteristics of independent
statehood.
10Breen, Complete Encyclopedia, pp. 12–16, and Sylvester S. Crosby, The Early
Coins of America, and the Laws Governing Their Issue (Boston, 1875), pp. 30–76.
11Sarah Kemble Knight, a traveler to the region, later confirmed that the coins went
by the name “Boston or Bay shillings” (The Journal of Madam Knight [1704; Boston:
Small, Maynard & Company, 1920], pp. 40–41).
12Mass. Bay Records, 4.1:80.
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Fig. 2.—A twelve-pence pine-tree shilling, issued sometime between
1667 and 1674. Image courtesy of Stack’s Bowers Galleries.
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Keeping the Bay shilling within Massachusetts often proved
an arduous task. Boston and Salem merchants, on occasion,
clandestinely exported Massachusetts coin when purchasing
imported goods, despite a 1654 law banning the export of
Bay shillings from the colony.13 The colonial governments on
Montserrat and Nevis soon recognized the circulation of “New
England Monies,” as did the assemblies of Maryland, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and Carolina at a later date.14 The coin even ap-
peared as far east as the Canary Islands and Mediterranean,
a visible manifestation of Boston’s integration into an Atlantic
commercial network.15
The Bay shilling exhibited the colonists’ pride and confidence
in their political and economic condition, but the mint was also
established during a period of great religious uncertainty. In the
decade previous, the English Civil War had seemingly provided
a grand opportunity for New England’s Puritans to spread their
particular brand of church and state to the homeland, partic-
ularly after the dissolution of the Church of England in 1641.
Indeed, between 1641 and 1643, many English reformers con-
sidered Massachusetts church polity a pattern worth emulating.
By the mid-1640s, however, English reformers came to real-
ize that only a broad Protestant coalition would ensure victory
for Parliament. The reluctance of the New England church to
compromise principle for expediency soon marginalized it back
home, even among those who had actively supported emigrat-
ing Puritans in the 1630s. By the late 1640s few, if any, English
reformers seriously advocated the Massachusetts model.
13Mass. Bay Records, 4.1:197–98.
14Acts of Assembly, Passed in the Island of Montserrat; from 1668, to 1740 (London,
1740), p. 20; Assembly of Nevis, 1672, Colonial Office 154/1, p. 4, National Archives;
Archives of Maryland: Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland,
ed. William Hand Browne, Clayton Colman Hall, and Bernard Christian Steiner, 72
vols. (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1883–1972), 7:532, 14:142–43; Executive
Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, ed. H. R. McIlwaine and Wilmer L. Hall,
5 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1925–45), 1:45; The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, from
1682 to 1801, ed. James T. Mitchell et al., 17 vols. (Harrisburg, Pa., and New York,
1896–1976), 1:152; The Statutes at Large of South Carolina, ed. Thomas Cooper and
David James McCord, 10 vols. (Columbia, S.C., 1836–41), 2:163.
15Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958), p. 153.
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The case worsened in the early 1650s. Privileging political
over religious conformity, the victorious Commonwealth toler-
ated any Protestant loyal to the cause. English men and women
were largely free to pursue a wide range of Protestant creeds,
including Quakerism, and even to bring their Books of Com-
mon Prayer out of the drawer and back into their devotionals.
In 1652, Sir Richard Saltonstall, a founding member of the
Massachusetts Bay Company and a former resident, shock-
ingly urged Boston ministers to practice religious inclusivity
within their own colony.16 The shifting priorities within the
transatlantic Puritan movement sparked a crisis of identity
in Massachusetts, one that just happened to coincide with a
tremendous commercial boom in New England.17
Economics was, of course, the mint’s raison d’eˆtre, but the
date of its founding—1652—suggests that something far deeper
may have been at stake. English reformers had publicly scorned
the Massachusetts mission to spark religious revolution across
the English world, after which the colony’s religious influence
seemed to collapse. The Boston coinage offered a degree of
psychological support: a refreshingly confident promulgation
that helped to retain the colony’s dignity and influence on the
Atlantic stage, despite the supposed avarice of former support-
ers back home. For this reason, mainly, the colony’s radical
Puritan ministers—most notably, Increase Mather—were soon
among the mint’s most passionate defenders, even as they si-
multaneously lambasted the growing primacy of wealth acqui-
sition over spiritual concerns.18
From the mint’s founding in 1652, then, the Bay shilling
meant different things to different people. Commercial expe-
diency was foremost on the minds of most merchants; indepen-
dent clergymen and legislators, on the other hand, were more
16Sir Richard Saltonstall to John Cotton and John Wilson, 1652, in The Saltonstall
Papers, 1607–1815, ed. Robert E. Moody, cited in Carla Gardina Pestana, The English
Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2004), p. 147.
17Pestana, English Atlantic, pp. 53–83, 123–48; Perry Miller, “Errand into the
Wilderness,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 10.1 (January 1953): 15–18.
18Increase Mather to Thomas Gouge, 21 November 1683, Colonial Office, 1/65,
no. 73iv, p. 329; [Increase Mather], New-England Vindicated (London 1689), pp. 2–3.
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concerned with the coin’s political and cultural significance.
Political autonomy was essential if Massachusetts was to retain
its spiritual purity under pressure from opportunistic Protes-
tants in Commonwealth England and, later, closet papists in
Restoration England. In their support of the Boston mint, the
grasping merchant and the radical Puritan cleric made strange
bedfellows, but the partnership rested upon their common de-
sire for autonomy, whether commercial, religious, or political.
As the most powerful, tangible symbol of the colony’s quest
for autonomy—whatever the kind—the mint enjoyed near-
universal support in the 1650s.
Cromwell, for his part, made no mention of the mint in any
of his writings. No evidence exists that he was aware of it;
if he was, the coinage apparently gave him no offense. The
Caribbean was Cromwell’s primary consideration on the west-
ern periphery of the Atlantic; New England was barely an
afterthought. The General Court had declared its formal al-
legiance to the Commonwealth. Cromwell was satisfied. Dur-
ing the period of his ascendancy, Massachusetts Bay enjoyed a
degree of autonomy unsurpassed at any other point in its his-
tory, and monetary sovereignty naturally proceeded therefrom.
There was no particular reason to acknowledge Commonwealth
authority on its money, and to do so would have displeased
many.
The colony’s relationship with England at midcentury was
cordial but tenuous and distant. As John Hull, master of the
Boston mint, recorded in his diary the day news of Cromwell’s
death hit Boston, the Lord Protector was “one that sought the
good of New England; though he seemed to be much wanting
in a thorough testimony against the blasphemers of our days.”19
Not until 1660 would the Massachusetts coinage encounter any
real objections from England, and when it did, the problem lay
not in the economic rationale but in the subversive, political
challenge inherent within the coin’s very stamp.
19John Hull, Diary, 25 February 1659, in Archaeologia Americana: Transactions
and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society, vol. 3 (Worcester, Mass.: AAS,
1857), pp. 186–87. Cromwell died on 3 September 1658.
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Charles II assumed the throne in May 1660. By October,
New England’s colonists had learned that he planned to re-
instate the Church of England. Mint master John Hull held
a private “day of humiliation at our house, for the state of
our native country . . . the church countenancing the old
liturgy, and formalities again to be practised.”20 Boston officials,
who had little choice otherwise, dutifully accepted the return
of the English monarchy, although they hoped that political
transformations in London would continue to have little effect
on their peculiar form of government.21
Massachusetts would soon be drawn out of its political isola-
tion. Samuel Maverick, former resident of the colony, launched
the opening salvo in a late 1660 pamphlet entitled A Briefe
Discription of New England. No oaths of fealty had been
taken in Boston since the king’s restoration, he wrote; offi-
cials were, instead, just “swearing theire subjects to submite to
lawes made only by themselfes.” “Indeed to Alleage a Statute
Law of England in one of their Courts would be a ridiculous
thing,” he continued, “[and] they likewise long since fell to
coyning of monies, melting downe all the English Coyne they
can gett.”22 In 1661, the Privy Council received word that the
mint had treasonously allowed “the King’s Coyne to be bought
and melted downe in Boston of the Massachusets Bay to be
new coynd there.”23 The rules regulating the mint prohibited
the conversion of English into Boston coin, but consistent al-
legations of the practice suggest that Hull rarely turned away
royally minted money.24
20Hull, Diary, 21 November 1660, cited in Pestana, English Atlantic, p. 218.
21Pestana, English Atlantic, p. 217, and Richard L. Bushman, King and People
in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985),
p. 16.
22Samuel Maverick, A Briefe Discription of New England and the Severall Townes
Therein (1660), in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2nd ser., vol. 1
(Boston, 1884–85), p. 241.
23John Giffard to Secretary Nicholas, 1661, Colonial Office, 1/15, no. 45, p. 96.
24The General Court allowed Hull one shilling in payment for every twenty shillings
minted. Over a century later, according to the editor of the third edition of Thomas
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The mint’s greatest offense, however, was not its occa-
sional melting down of English coin—most melted money was
Spanish—but, rather, its symbolic import. Robert Mason, pro-
prietor of New Hampshire, and Edward Godfrey, governor of
Maine, acknowledged as much in a petition to the king in 1662.
The Bay Colony had “for these many yeares together past en-
deavoured to model and contrive themselves into a free state,”
they alleged, listing the “coyning of money with their own stamp
and signature” as evidence thereof.25 Mason and Godfrey, of
course, had their personal agendas: both were notoriously jeal-
ous of Boston’s hegemonic influence across New England. But
a more neutral observer, Director-General Peter Stuyvesant
of New Netherland, reached the same conclusion when he
reported to the Dutch West India Company in October
1660 that though other New England settlers remained “good
Royalists,” Boston “remains faithful to its old principle a free
state.”26
Of course, the Boston mint violated the royal prerogative, an
understandably sensitive issue throughout the restored Stuart
regime. The king’s wrath, however, could still be managed
by clever courtiers, as a 1662 royal audience with Sir Thomas
Temple demonstrates. Temple, proprietor of Nova Scotia, met
with Charles II and his Privy Council to discuss the “state of
affairs in the Massachusets.” “In the course of the conversation
Sir Thomas took some of the money out of his pocket, and
presented it to the King.” The money was none other than
the Boston shilling. Upon seeing the coin, Charles displayed
“great warmth against that colony; among other things he said,
they had invaded his prerogative by coining money.” Temple,
“a real friend to the colony” who had lived in Boston in the
Hutchinson’s History of Massachusetts, “the mint master, John Hull, raised a large
fortune from it” (Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, 1:165n).
25Report of Robert Mason and Edward Godfrey to the King, 15 February 1662,
Colonial Office, 1/16, no.18, p. 37. According to Mason and Godfrey, there were some
in the colony who “have said that before their province should submit to any appeals
to England they would sell their Collony to the King of Spaine.”
26Peter Stuyvesant to the Directors of the West India Company, 19 October 1660,
in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. E. B.
O’Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, 15 vols. (Albany, 1856–87), 14:484.
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1650s, rushed to the mint’s defense, claiming that economic
reasons alone had required its founding. “The colonists had
but little acquaintance with law,” he insisted; “they had no ill
design, and thought it no crime to make money for their own
use.”
Taking a second look at the coin, Charles then “inquired
what tree that was.” Temple replied that it was the “royal oak”
(the Bay shilling was stamped with an oak between 1660 and
1667), the same material reportedly used to build the ship that
carried young Charles across the Channel into exile following
his defeat by Cromwell at the Battle of Worcester in 1651. “The
Massachuset’s [sic] people,” continued Temple, “not daring to
put his Majesty’s name on their coin during the late troubles,
had impressed upon it the emblem of the oak which preserved
his Majesty’s life.” Temple thus admitted a political rationale
regarding the coin, but he ingeniously turned that meaning
on its head. Rather than flaunting Charles’s prerogative, the
Bay shilling had, albeit surreptitiously, declared the colony’s
support for it, he argued. Temple’s explanation was entirely
disingenuous and false—Massachusetts had firmly supported
Parliament during the Civil War—yet the story “put the king
into good humour, and disposed him to hear what Sir Thomas
had to say in their favour.” As Temple proceeded to defend
Massachusetts, Charles grazed the Bay shilling between his
two fingers, chuckling as he “called them a parcel of honest
dogs.”27
In the age of empire building, however, whereby the king
personified the rising nation-state, coining money without royal
27The account of the exchange from which I have been quoting dates a century
after its occurrence, in a 1768 letter to Thomas Hollis (Memoirs of Thomas Hollis,
Esq., vol. 1 [London, 1780], p. 397). Confirmation that it in fact took place can be
found in a letter from the Massachusetts General Court, 30 October 1684, to London
claiming that “in 1662, when our first Agents were in England, some of our Money was
showed by Sir Thomas Temple at the Council-Table, and no dislike thereof manifested
by any of those right honourable Persons: much less a forbidding of it” (Massachusetts
Archives Collection, vol. 56, no. 336, quoted in Crosby, Early Coins, p. 76). See also
S. F. Haven, “The Coinage of Massachusetts,” in Archaeologia Americana: Transactions
and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society, vol. 3 (Worcester, Mass., 1857),
pp. 292–93; and Rogers Ruding, Annals of the Coinage of Great Britain and Its
Dependencies, 2 vols. (1817; 3rd ed., London, 1840), 1:416.
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permission transgressed the rights not only of the king, who
seemed not to be terribly concerned about the issue, but those
of the kingdom as well. And so, even though the mint’s oppo-
nents employed the language of royal authority, they were also
defending the rights of Parliament as much as—or, especially
in the later years of the controversy, even more so than—those
of the king.
In 1665, Charles sent a royal commission to New England,
accompanied by nearly four hundred troops, to survey the ter-
ritory with a particular eye for colonial infractions of the Navi-
gation Acts. The commissioners trekked through Connecticut,
Rhode Island, and Plymouth Colonies, where the governments
“made great promises of their Loyalty and obedience.” When
the king’s representatives arrived in Boston, however, the Gen-
eral Court promptly declared the commission illegal, refused
all cooperation, and, according to the commissioners, “pro-
claymed by sound of Trumpet that the Generall Court was
the Supreamest Judicatory in that Province.”28
The commissioners were not cowed, and they shortly is-
sued a host of royal demands to the Massachusetts govern-
ment, including that the “mint house . . . be repealed, for
coyning is a royall prerogative.”29 Massachusetts Captain James
Oliver and his wife Mary testified that one of the commis-
sioners told the couple “we were both rebels and traitors for
minting money and printing, which was treason for the coun-
try to do.”30 Dominated by independent, radical Puritans, the
General Court utterly rejected the commission’s injunction to
abolish the mint; to do so, it proclaimed, was contrary to “the
liberties of Englishmen, so wee can see no reason to submit
thereto.”31
28George Carr to Secretary Lord Arlington, 14 December 1665, Colonial Office
1/19, no. 143, pp. 334, 338.
29Mass. Bay Records, 4.2:211.
30Affidavit of Captain James and Mary Oliver, 1666, Mass. Archives, vol. 106, nos.
125 and 139.
31Petition of the Massachusetts General Court to Charles II, 1 August 1665, in
Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New-Hampshire, from the Earliest
Period of its Settlement: 1623–1776, ed. Nathaniel Bouton, 7 vols. (Concord, N.H.,
1867–73), 1:295.
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The Massachusetts charter derived its authority from the
Crown, to be sure, but the General Court insisted that the char-
ter had granted the Bay Colony’s founders quasi-autonomous
powers to manage Massachusetts as they saw fit. The only re-
quirement they recognized—not just regarding the coinage, re-
markably, but regarding anything—was that the colony pay the
customary “Royal Fifth” to the king if gold or silver mines were
ever to be discovered within Massachusetts territory, an ex-
tremely unlikely event. The king’s commissioners, for their part,
were in no frame of mind to soften their report of the colony’s
bold rejection of Charles II’s authority. “They of this Colony say
that King Charles the first gave them power to make Lawes,”
they noted, “and that so long as they pay the fifth of all Gold and
Silver Oar which they shall get, they are free to use their priv-
iledges . . . [and] are not obliged to the King but by civility.”32
Understandably incensed, Charles ordered the General
Court to send agents to London at once. The General Court
contemplated an overtly defiant letter, but a growing faction of
moderates begged the body to refrain from such a rash course.
Indeed, the younger generation of New England merchants,
many of them not Puritans or, at least, not devout, had increas-
ingly come to despise the hardline, commercially insensitive,
clerical faction that dominated the General Court. Royal inter-
vention, the merchants thought, might be just the counterforce
that was needed.33 Declining to send agents to London, the
General Court nonetheless offered the royal navy a gift of “two
very large masts,” a gesture of appeasement.34 Charles and his
Privy Council elected not to pursue the matter, and from 1666
to 1674 all official communication between Old and New En-
gland ceased.35
32George Carr to Secretary Lord Arlington, 14 December 1665, Colonial Office,
1/19, no. 143, p. 339.
33Bailyn, New England Merchants, pp. 112–14, 143, 159–60, and Barnes, Dominion
of New England, pp. 9–10.
34Mass. Bay Records, 4.2:317–18.
35For more on the failed commission, see Bailyn, New England Merchants, pp. 119–
26; Michael Garibaldi Hall, Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676–1703
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 11–15; Dunn, Puritans
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The Boston mint survived for the time being. The English
state had far greater concerns at the moment than picking
a fight with a colony that, relative to the tobacco and sugar
plantations, contributed little to the imperial economic system.
In the years following the commission’s journey, England suf-
fered through the Great Plague of London (1665–66), the Great
Fire of London (1666), two additional years of warfare with
Holland, and a third Anglo-Dutch War in 1672–74. The con-
troversy over the mint paled in comparison. Edicts from the
Crown, in this early period of the Restoration, generally re-
quired a certain degree of voluntary compliance from the entity
being commanded, for the king lacked sufficient wherewithal to
enforce his will in all cases. So rather than expending valuable
time, money, and resources, the Crown grudgingly tolerated
a headstrong, politically jealous Massachusetts government. As
colonial administrator Mathias Nicolls conceded in 1666, the
task remained “to find out a way to bring downe the pride of
the Massachusetts.”36
A decade later, the Crown was finally ready to address the
New England question. In 1675 Charles II established the
Council of Trade and Plantations, or Lords of Trade, a nine-
man standing committee within the Privy Council explicitly
charged with keeping a close eye on colonial affairs. The Lords
of Trade soon commissioned an upstart courtier named Edward
Randolph to convey the king’s instructions to Massachusetts
to send agents to London immediately. Randolph arrived in
Boston in June 1676. Self-important and often pompous, he
quickly earned a reputation among his opponents as a meddling
busybody. The Massachusetts Court of Assistants, the upper
house of the General Court, hastily dismissed him but, shortly
and Yankees, pp. 151–63; Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 7–8; and Andrews,
Colonial Period, 3:63–68.
36Colonel Mathias Nicolls to Secretary Lord Arlington, 9 April 1666, Colonial Office,
1/20, no. 42, p. 82.
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thereafter, dispatched two agents to call upon the Lords of
Trade.37
Randolph, in the meantime, journeyed across the colony on
an information-gathering junket. To his delight, he found a mo-
tivated merchant minority eager to wrest political control from
the parochial, Puritan-led majority. These cosmopolitan mer-
chants, who thirsted for power of their own, believed that the
colony’s dogged independency threatened a profitable commer-
cial engagement with England as well as the social distinction
that would flow from it.38 Voicing the opposite view, which also
prevailed among the rest of the governing leadership, Gover-
nor John Leverett, a former captain under Cromwell, shock-
ingly insisted that “the Laws made by Our King and Parliament
obligeth them in nothing but what consists with the Interest of
New England.”39
When he returned to London in October 1676, Randolph
submitted a lengthy, confidential report to the Lords of Trade.
Lambasting Massachusetts on nearly every page, he settled on
the Boston mint as the most prominent instance of all that was
wrong with the colony. “As a marke of soveraignty they coin
money,” he wrote, “stamped with inscription Massachusets and
a tree in the center, on the one side, and New England, with
the year 1652 and the value of the piece on the reverse.”40
37Hall, Edward Randolph, pp. 21–24, 30–31; Barnes, Dominion of New England,
pp. 13–15; and Dunn, Puritans and Yankees, pp. 214–16.
38Bailyn, New England Merchants, pp. 112–14, 143, 159–60, 168–69; Dunn, Pu-
ritans and Yankees, pp. 217–19; J. M. Sosin, English America and the Revolution
of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 30; Richard S. Dunn, “Imperial Pressures on
Massachusetts and Jamaica, 1675–1700,” in Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675–
1775, ed. Alison Gilbert Olson and Richard Maxwell Brown (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press, 1970), p. 63; and Barnes, Dominion of New England, p. 44.
39Quoted in Bailyn, New England Merchants, p. 155.
40Edward Randolph, “An answer to severall heads of enquiry concerning the present
state of New-England,” 12 October 1676, in Edward Randolph: Including his Letters
and Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America,
ed. Robert Noxon Toppan and Alfred T. S. Goodrick, 7 vols. (Boston, 1898–1909),
2:229. Even before Randolph departed for Boston, the Lords of Trade exhibited great
hostility toward the mint. See Minutes of the Committee for Trade and Plantations, 1
December 1675, Colonial Office 1/35, no. 50, p. 269. Two other petitions to the Crown,
one from Robert Mason, a proprietor of New Hampshire and the other anonymous, also
addressed the issue, in May 1675 and July 1676. See Observation on the State of New
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The 1652 stamp was a bit of a mystery. A quarter century
after the mint had begun operating, the date pressed into the
back of newly minted coins remained 1652. Randolph gladly of-
fered his own explanation. “All the money is stamped with these
figures, 1652,” he wrote, “the year being the aera of the com-
monwealth, wherin they erected themselves into a free state . . .
which year is still commemorated on their coin.”41 No doubt
many colonials looked back on the 1650s as a time of greater
political autonomy than the inhabitants enjoyed at present, and
because neither mint nor government officials bothered ex-
plaining the 1652 stamp, Randolph’s explanation was certainly
compelling. Five years earlier, in 1671, the former, weaker
Council of Trade offered a slightly different explanation. “They
still continue to coine money there but putt the date of 1652
on the stamp of it, that they might not seeme to trespass on
his Majesties Prerogative.”42 The remark had a distinct ring of
truth about it. The year 1652 was still eight years distant from
Charles II’s coronation, and so there was no royal prerogative
to violate; a 1676 stamp, on the other hand, would have consti-
tuted a more flagrant assault on the ancient monarchical right.
Certainly much had changed since 1652. By 1676, as the min-
isters saw it, New England was almost unrecognizable. Greed,
fornication, materialism, Sabbath-breaking, apostasy, pride, and
disobedience had supplanted the first generation’s piety and
independence, and a devastating Indian war and an invasive
Crown plagued the colony. “New-Englands Calamity,” Increase
Mather called it. In one of his many jeremiads, Mather cited
1652 as a time of greater godliness. After reading a letter of
England, May 1675, Colonial Office 324/3; Calendar of State Papers: Colonial Series,
America and the West Indies, 1574–1738, ed. W. Noel Sainsbury, J. W. Fortescue,
and Cecil Hedlam, 44 vols. (London, 1860–1969), vol. for 1675–66, p. 156; Petition of
Robert Mason to the king, July 1676, in Documents of New-Hampshire, 1:325.
41Randolph, Letters and Official Papers, 2:229. The Massachusetts agents who later
responded to Randolph’s accusations commented simply, “As for the year 1652 there
was no alteration then made in the Government.” See William Stoughton and Peter
Bulkeley, “Answer to Mr. Randolphs Narrative of the state of New England,” 28 June
1678, in Randolph, Letters and Official Papers, 3:9.
42Minutes of the Council for Foreign Plantations, 21 June 1671, Colonial Office,
1/26, no. 78, p. 200.
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that year from his now-deceased father, Richard, celebrating a
successful ministry among the Indians, Mather admonished his
congregation: “How would he mourn if he were here at this
day to behold the strange degeneracy that is in the spirit of the
present Generation.”43 Like Israel, New England had forsaken
its original mission and turned to worldly pursuits. Calamity
was fast approaching. There was a strangeness in using money
to hearken back to a spiritual era—money was a corrupting
force—yet the 1652 shilling, wittingly or unwittingly, reminded
money holders that a greater spiritual purity had once pre-
vailed. Though he never explicitly addressed the retention of
the 1652 stamp in his defense of the mint, Mather may well
have seen it as conveying a nostalgic, cultural import that re-
called the glories of the colony’s founding generation even as it
reasserted the self-determination they had sacrificed so much
to achieve.
Although the Lords of Trade delayed launching a formal in-
vestigation into Randolph’s charges, they finally did so in July
1677. Out of the twenty-four alleged “crimes” Massachusetts
had committed, the first listed was none other than the Boston
mint. “They have erected a publick Mint in Boston and Coined
money with their own Impress,” the charge read, portraying
the mint as a grand affront to the monarch and nation-state
more generally, encompassing as it did such other transgres-
sions as the colonists’ refusal to take oaths of allegiance and
supremacy to the king and having “declared themselves a Com-
mon Wealth.”44
The Boston agents, upon their arrival in London, faced a
merciless round of questions. Regarding the mint, the Lords
of Trade asked “whether Treason be not herein Committed”
and, if so, whether the treason was enough to have the Mas-
sachusetts Bay “Corporation dissolved and Charter forfeited?”45
43Increase Mather, An Earnest Exhortation to the Inhabitants of New-England
(Boston, 1676), pp. 1 and 22. See also Miller, “Errand into the Wilderness,” pp. 3–32.
44Objections against the Massachusetts Charter, July 1677, Colonial Office, 1/41,
no. 35, p. 85.
45Memoranda concerning New England, July 1677, Colonial Office, 1/41, no. 32,
p. 75.
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The agents replied that “they were necessitated to it [the mint],
about the yeare 1652, for the support of their Trade, and have
not, hitherto, discontinued it, as being never excepted against,
or disallowed by His Majesty.” This final point was entirely
false; the 1665 commission had explicitly demanded the mint’s
repeal. Adopting a conciliatory stance, the agents proceeded to
“beg pardon if they have offended” and promised that oaths of
allegiance and supremacy would henceforth be taken by gov-
ernment officials.46 The agents’ strategy was straightforward:
spare the coinage by persuading the Crown that the sole ratio-
nale for the mint was economic, not political.
After taking the matter under advisement for several days,
the Lords of Trade affirmed the absolute “necessity of bring-
ing those People under a more palpable declaration of their
obedience.” Among the more egregious offenses, the colony
“had transgress’d in presuming to Coyne Money, which is an
Act of Sovereignty, and to which they were by noe Grant suf-
ficiently authorized.” Still, the Lords recommended that the
king lead the way toward a face-saving compromise that would
redound to the benefit of all. If the General Court were sim-
ply to “sollicit his Majesties Pardon for the offence that is
past,” then “upon due application,” the King might allow the
colony to continue the mint under his authority, thus maintain-
ing the royal prerogative and preserving the mint’s economic
utility while neutralizing its political offensiveness. Of course,
the Navigation Acts must also be “religiously observed.” Obey
these and sundry other instructions, the body promised, and
“His Majestie will not destroy their [Massachusetts] Charter,
but rather by a Supplemental one to bee given them, set all
things right that are now amiss.”47
46Journals of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 19 July 1677, in Randolph, Letters
and Official Papers, 2:276.
47Journals of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 27 July and 2 August 1677, in
Randolph, Letters and Official Papers, 2:277–79 and 283. See also Lords of Trade to
Charles II, 19 July 1677, Colonial Office, 1/41, no. 30, p. 66, where the committee
advised that the king “pardon them for coining” and thereafter “grant them a license
for coining.” For more on the investigation by the Lords of Trade, see Hall, Edward
Randolph, pp. 36–39, and Dunn, “Imperial Pressures,” p. 63.
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The Lords’ final judgment, which utterly rejected Randolph’s
insistence on a revocation of the charter, was surprisingly mod-
erate. Imperial sanction of the Boston coinage, together with an
apology and a new stamp, would enhance royal authority while
avoiding any resentment or resistance that might arise from
completely abolishing the mint. Having a distinctive medium
of exchange in Boston, now directly proclaiming the king’s au-
thority, would no longer contradict the greater political agenda
from London but would, rather, complement it. The mint
would be transformed from a competing political-economic in-
stitution into one that supported the Crown’s agenda, from a
symbol of peripheral autonomy into one of imperial strength
and power. Naturally, the 1652 stamp would have no place
in this revamped, Crown-approved mint. The relieved agents
proceeded to “humbly Implore his Majesty’s gratious Pardon”
for the “extreamely usefull” mint, expressing their gratitude
that the coinage “may be continued to them under,” of course,
whatever “Impress He pleases.”48
Had the General Court followed their agents’ advice and
apologized for the mint, the entire character of the coinage
would have been dramatically, and irrevocably, altered. The
mint would continue to exist but it would do so not by the
agency or prerogative of the Massachusetts government—for
which due apology would have been made—but by the express
permission of the king. In disregarding the agents’ recommen-
dation, the General Court proudly insisted that when the king
“shall truely be informed of the symplicity of our actings, the
publicke joy thereof to his subjects here, and the great damage
that the stoppage thereof will inevitable [sic] be to our neces-
sary commerce . . . his majestye will not account those to be
freinds to his crowne that shall seeke to interrupt us therein.”
The matter of the stamp was not negotiable. “Wee shall take it
as his Majesty’s signall ouning of us,” the General Court chided
its agents, “if he will please to order such an impresse as shall
48Answer of the Agents of the Massachusetts, 20 July 1677, Colonial Office, 1/41,
no. 31, p. 71.
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be to him most acceptable.”49 Independence was a precious
commodity, and it was not to be relinquished in fact or in
form. The Bay shilling would not announce that the colonists
were “owned” by their king.
The mint controversy was a battle over symbols, one waged
not only between England and Massachusetts but also within
the Bay Colony. The Lords of Trade recognized that for royal
authority to assert itself properly in Massachusetts, the mint
must be reclaimed for the Crown. The independent faction of
the General Court, which resisted such a move, exposed the
mint as the political institution that it truly was. From the per-
spective of the moderate faction, of course, such intractability
was manifestly absurd, risking as it did the very existence of an
economically useful institution.
When they learned of the survival of their charter, most of the
colonists jubilantly partook in an official day of thanksgiving.50
Now that fear of a royal takeover had passed, Massachusetts
went about its business as before, ignoring virtually all of the
Lords’ demands; presumably expecting English officials to ac-
quiesce as they had in 1665, the General Court issued neither
apologies for the mint nor oaths of allegiance to the king.51
Trade was the only matter on which the General Court par-
tially relented, and even so, its members still managed to assert
their own legislative authority by pushing through a colonial
statute quite similar to the Navigation Acts.52
Celebrations were premature. The following year, Randolph
happily notified the Lords of Trade that the General Court had
neither taken the necessary oaths nor “suspended the worke
of their minte.” By passing a law nearly identical to the Nav-
igation Acts, the General Court, he insisted, “doe encourage”
the colonists “to beleive that noe Acts of Parliament . . . are in
49Massachusetts General Court to William Stoughton and Peter Bulkeley, 10
October 1678, in Mass. Bay Records, 5:202–3.
50Mass. Bay Records, 5:163.
51Hall, Edward Randolph, pp. 39–41.
52Mass. Bay Records, 5:155.
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force with them.”53 Furious about the colony’s noncompliance,
the Lords of Trade appointed Randolph collector, surveyor,
and searcher of the customs for all New England, the first im-
perial officer to serve full-time in the Bay Colony.54 The agents
begged the Lords to grant them “liberty to recommend a per-
son,” calling Randolph “a person extreamly obnoxious” who
had “notoriously trespassed upon truth” and was “not likely to
continue unbiased,” but the body would hear none of it. In
September 1679, after some delay, Randolph sailed again for
Massachusetts.55
Randolph suffered a predictably hostile reception upon his
arrival in Boston in January. A poem soon circulated sar-
donically saluting the “wicked” Randolph’s return to the Bay
Colony: “Welcome now back againe; as is the whip, to a fooles
back; as water in a ship.”56 “I am received at Boston more like
a spy, than one of his majesty’s servants,” he wrote the gover-
nor of Plymouth; they “have prepared a welcome for me, by a
paper of scandalous verses, all persons taking liberty to abuse
me in their discourses.”57 Never one to back down, Randolph
set to work prosecuting alleged offenders of the Navigation
Acts, bravely boarding suspicious vessels in defiance of violent
threats and harassment. All the while, the mint continued to
turn out coins with neither apology nor imprint of the king.58
53Report of Edward Randolph to the Lords of Trade, April 1678, in Randolph,
Letters and Official Papers, 6:72–75.
54Journals of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 8 April 1678, in Randolph, Letters
and Official Papers, 2:294–95; Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series,
ed. W. L. Grant and James Munroe, 6 vols. (Hereford, U.K.: 1908–12), 1:843. See also
Hall, Edward Randolph, pp. 42–46; Bailyn, New England Merchants, p. 158; Dunn,
“Imperial Pressures,” p. 62; Barnes, Dominion of New England, p. 16; and Dunn,
Puritans and Yankees, p. 216.
55William Stoughton and Peter Bulkeley to the Lords of Trade, April 1678, in
Randolph, Letters and Official Papers, 6:75.
56“Randolph’s Welcome Back Againe,” January 1680, in Randolph, Letters and
Official Papers, 3:61–64.
57Edward Randolph to Governor Josiah Winslow, 29 January 1680, in Randolph,
Letters and Official Papers, 3:65.
58Edward Randolph to Sir Edmund Andros, 3, 4, and 7 January 1680, Colonial
Office, 1/44, no. 31, pp. 75–76. See also Abstract of Letters from Edward Randolph,
1682, Colonial Office, 1/48, no. 112, pp. 347–51.
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The time had come for drastic reform within the government.
“There is an absolute necessity of Erecting a Great Councill”
and “Generall Governor,” Randolph adamantly avowed to Sir
Edmund Andros, governor of New York.59 The following year,
Randolph, still in Boston, again petitioned the Crown. Never
one to mince words, he declared that the “unparralell’d mis-
demeanors & contempts”—including the coining of money—
amounted to “no lesse than High Treason.” “United under
one generall Government,” he reasoned, New England “will
be more serviceable to the Crown,” for such an arrangement
would instill “dependance and Submission.” The mint alone
constituted a “great crime & misdemeanor,” one of several
offenses “sufficient to void their Charter.”60 Randolph reiter-
ated the charge in 1682. “They call the money coyned in this
colony, New England coyne,” he wrote, “engageing the whole
plantation in the matter of their mint and thereby bespeaking
the influence this small government would have over all the
neighbouring colonys.”61
The Lords of Trade likewise persisted in their Bay shilling
assault. “They still carry on their mint without permission,”
the body reported nine months after Randolph’s arrival, “and
obstruct the working of the Acts of Trade and Naviga-
tion in every possible way,” taking “not the least notice” of
royal instructions.62 Late in 1681, the Lords again berated
the colony for the “great crime you are answerable for in
coyning money,” for “fresh complaints” of smuggling, and
for the denial of religious liberty to Anglicans. “You pre-
sume to continue your Mint without regard to the penalties
thereby incurred,” they warned the General Court, threatening
59Edward Randolph to Sir Edmund Andros, 4 January 1680, Colonial Office, 1/44,
no. 31, pp. 75–76.
60Petition of Edward Randolph to Charles II, 6 April 1681, and Edward Randolph
to Sir Leoline Jenkins, 30 April 1681, in Randolph, Letters and Official Papers, 3:90
and 6:89.
61Edward Randolph to the Earl of Clarendon, 14 June 1682, in Randolph, Letters
and Official Papers, 3:159.
62Report of the Lords of Trade to Charles II, 15 September 1680, Colonial Office,
5/904, pp. 87–94; Calendar of State Papers, vol. for 1677–80, p. 598.
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finally to revoke the charter if instructions remained
unheeded.63
The incessant demands beg the question: why was the mint
still operating as late as 1682? Besides the aforementioned dis-
tractions of 1665 through 1674, the Crown faced a host of trou-
bling developments in the latter half of the 1670s, including the
Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis of 1678–81, when proto-
Whigs in Parliament sought to exclude the heir apparent, the
Duke of York, Charles II’s younger brother and future James
II, from later claiming the throne. A pressing political crisis on
the all-important island of Jamaica, moreover, demanded the
Lords’ utmost attention from 1675 through 1682. The New En-
gland mattter was one the Crown could afford to defer. Once
these calamities had eased, which they mostly had by 1682, the
Crown had more attention to spare for New England.
Sensing a political shift in London and worried that the
charter was now truly at risk, the moderate faction in Mas-
sachusetts, led by Governor Simon Bradstreet, pled with the
independence-minded members of the General Court to coop-
erate fully. The independent faction still controlled the judicial
system and lower house of the General Court, yet in February
1682, the moderate faction finally persuaded the lower house
to instruct its agents to “begg pardon for the fault of coining.”64
Three months later, in May 1682, John Hull’s contract as mint-
master expired, and there was no talk of renewing it. Hull died
the following year, and whether or not the mint continued after
May 1682 is unknown, though nothing in the records suggests
that it did.65 In June 1686, Joseph Dudley claimed that the
mint “hath [been a] long time discontinued,” and so it likely
expired with Hull.66
63Report of the Lords of Trade to Charles II, October 1681, Colonial Office, 1/47,
no. 79, pp. 188–90.
64Instructions to Joseph Dudley and John Richards, 15 February 1682, Colonial
Office, 1/48, no. 32, p. 147.
65Mass. Bay Records, 5:43–44.
66Dudley Council, 2 June 1686, in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, 2nd ser., vol. 13 (Boston, 1899–1900), p. 244.
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Following a series of protracted back-and-forth exchanges
with the General Court and Massachusetts agents, the Lords of
Trade recommended a writ against the charter in June 1683.67
Randolph had recently submitted seventeen “articles of high
misdemeanour” against the colony, and in the draft version, the
recently deceased mint was first among them.68 Yet the General
Court still had room for compromise. One month after the writ
recommendation, Charles II stipulated that the charter might
survive if the Crown were invited to regulate and revise its
specific articles. If the General Court declined that offer, the
attorney general would bring suit against the colony, judicial
proceedings that would almost certainly return a finding that
the charter was null and void. “We in Boston are threatened
with a Condemnation of our Charter and consequently the
Loss of all our Priviledges,” including the “necessity of Coyning
money with a peculiar stampe of our owne,” Reverend Increase
Mather lamented in November 1683.69
Impassioned debate soon erupted between the moderate and
independent factions, Massachusetts moderates angrily main-
taining that it was sheer madness to continue resisting the im-
perial impulse for consolidation. Nevertheless, despite the
moderates’ pleadings, in December 1683, the lower house
voted to reject Charles’s proposition and vowed to fight their
king in his own courts. The effort miscarried—indeed, it was
never implemented because the attorney for Massachusetts
failed to arrive on time for trial—and on 23 October 1684,
the Crown vacated the Massachusetts charter.70
With the charter now dissolved, the moderates threw
their support behind Randolph and the new prospective
67Hall, Edmund Randolph, pp. 61–83; Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 20–
21; and Philip S. Haffenden, “The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675–1688: Part
I,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 15.3 (July 1958): 300–307.
68For the draft and final version of the articles of high misdemeanor, see Randolph,
Letters and Official Papers, 3:229–34.
69Mather to Gouge, 21 November 1683.
70Hall, Edward Randolph, pp. 79–83; Haffenden, “Colonial Charters, Part I,”
p. 307; and Barnes, Dominion of New England, pp. 22–24.
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government.71 Details were still sketchy. Dudley, for his part,
recommended that the Crown “betrust the Government wholly
to persons among us,” so that the new government might
carry greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people.72 Until May
1686, the General Court, still dominated by the independence-
leaning coalition, continued to sit as if nothing had happened,
making no official acknowledgment that the charter had, in
fact, been nullified.73
The fate of the recently defunct Boston mint was, much like
that of the General Court itself, unknowable. No details were
forthcoming as to whether the Crown would resurrect it in al-
tered form. In November 1684, just a month after the charter’s
revocation, the secretary of the Lords of Trade asked the Com-
missioners of the Royal Mint to recommend whether the king
“shall continue the mint in Boston for his own use or abolish
it.”74 Either the mint should remain closed, they replied, or
its coins should be brought to the same silver weight as the
English shilling. The 1652 stamp, however, tended to sway the
commissioners against reopening the Boston mint. “It may also
be observed,” they noted, “that though they have continued this
unwarrantable way of Coyneing of Money ever since the year
1652, yet there is noe alteration of date [as it] appears upon
their Coynes.”75 A Boston mint under royal direction would not
retain the old charter stamp, of course, but even so, the mental
linkage between Massachusetts sovereignty and coining money
might still persist, they argued. The Massachusetts shilling, for
three decades, had represented the colony’s most virulently
independent political aspirations; a mere change in the im-
print, they feared, though significant, might not fully obliterate
this association. Not yet persuaded, the Lords of Trade were
71Hall, Edward Randolph, p. 86.
72Joseph Dudley to Edward Randolph, 1 December 1684, in Randolph, Letters and
Official Papers, 3:336.
73Hall, Edward Randolph, pp. 97–99, and Dunn, “Imperial Pressures,” p. 65.
74William Blathwayt to Henry Guy, 22 November 1684, Colonial Office, 5/904,
p. 218.
75Commissioners of the Mint to the Lords of the Treasury, 15 January 1685, Colo-
nial Office, 1/60, no. 88iii, pp. 262–63.
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still mulling over the matter when the empire took a sudden
turn.
On 6 February 1685, Charles II suffered an apoplectic fit.
Having died with no legitimate children, his throne passed to
his Roman Catholic brother James, the Duke of York. Seven
months later, James II announced the commission of a grand
council to preside over all of New England, of which Joseph
Dudley would be council president. There was no provision for
an elected assembly.
Events thereafter proceeded at a painstakingly slow pace.
The royal commission for Dudley and his unelected councilors
did not even arrive until May 1686, whereupon the bitter and
defeated General Court finally adjourned.76 According to the
king’s commission, the Dudley council—dominated by the most
prominent merchants of Boston, loyal to Randolph and the
Bay moderates—was granted full and sole authority to govern
until such time as Sir Edmund Andros, the recently appointed
governor of the prospective Dominion of New England, were
to land on its shores, whereafter Dudley and the councilors
would assume a mere advisory role.77
Suddenly, without any warning whatsoever, Randolph re-
versed himself on the matter of the mint, lobbying the Lords
of Trade about the absolute “necessity” of a Boston coinage.
“Since they have Ceased coining,” he stated, “their money is
every day shipd off for England. . . . Tis a hard matter to gett
£100 in silver.”78 For ten years Randolph had railed against the
colony’s mint, but now that his allies held the reins of power, a
Dominion mint under royal authority might well be desirable.
The Spanish operated mints in Mexico and Peru; the Dominion
of New England could do the same. The Dudley council also
76Philip S. Haffenden, “The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675–1688: Part
II,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 15.4 (October 1958): 452–60, 465–66, and
Sosin, English America, p. 12.
77Hall, Edward Randolph, pp. 90–99; Bailyn, New England Merchants, p. 175;
Barnes, Dominion of New England, p. 24; Sosin, English America, pp. 66–67; and
Dunn, “Imperial Pressures,” p. 65.
78Edward Randolph to Secretary William Blathwayt, 29 May 1686, in Randolph,
Letters and Official Papers, 6:172.
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saw the value of Randolph’s reasoning; for many years its mem-
bers had supported a mint primarily for the economic benefit
of having a uniform currency. “Our Trade for want of money is
much perplexed and decayed,” the council now petitioned the
king, humbly imploring “his Majestys Licence, direction and
Impress . . . for establishing a Mint in this his Dominion.”79
Notwithstanding this support for a coinage, the Commis-
sioners of the Royal Mint reiterated their opposition in a
second report, sent to the Lord Treasurer in July 1686. Rec-
ollecting that a 1678 proposal for a Jamaican mint had been
“found impracticable,” the mint commissioners insisted that a
Boston coinage of any sort remained inadvisable. Neverthe-
less, the commissioners agreed to come up with “some other
Inscriptions more agreeable to the Kings Prerogative to be
Stampt upon the Coyne of New England, if a Mint be settled
there.”80
Andros, still in London and obliged to weigh in on the matter,
sided with Randolph and Dudley. Foreign “Peices of Eight,”
he argued, are of “unequal weight and value,” and so imposing
some regularity on the currency seemed wise. In fact, such a
consideration had prompted the founding of the mint in 1652, a
decision Andros defended to the Lords, although this time the
mint would “be performed by his Majesty’s Officers, and the
profit that shall arise by the Coinage, applied to his Majesty’s
use.”81 Andros’s recommendation, however, may have been less
generous than self-serving. Andros almost certainly understood
that a mint at the seat of his North American empire would
enhance his power and prestige; indeed, he may have even
fancied that the prospective coinage would bear his image.
Notwithstanding the Andros endorsement, though, the Lords
79Dudley Council, 2 June 1686, in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, 2nd ser., vol. 13 (Boston, 1899–1900), p. 244.
80Commissioners of the Mint to the Lord Treasurer, 15 July 1686, Colonial Office,
1/60, no. 88ii, p. 260.
81[Sir Edmund Andros], “Reasons for a Mint in New-England,” 23 October 1686,
Colonial Office, 1/60, no. 88v, p. 266. For the official response from the Commissioners
of the Royal Mint to Andros, delivered on the same day, see Colonial Office, 1/60, no.
88vii, p. 269.
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of Trade formally advised against the idea in late October 1686,
a recommendation the king chose to follow.82 In order to fully
vanquish all vestiges of an independent Bay colony, the symbol
of that independence—the Bay shilling—had to be eradicated,
not amended.
On 18 April 1689, after news arrived that the Stuart dy-
nasty had been overthrown, Bostonians of virtually all political
persuasions rose up against the Dominion regime, arrested An-
dros, Randolph, and, later, Dudley, and pledged their utmost
loyalty to William III. Many inhabitants wished to reestablish
the old Bay Colony government, but some of the more promi-
nent moderates argued, with success, that the best course was
to establish a Committee of Safety, with Simon Bradstreet serv-
ing as provisional governor, and await orders from England.83
Early in the new year, Bradstreet instructed Massachusetts’
agents in London to pursue two key objectives: “You are to so-
licite that the liberty of coinage may be allowed us,” he wrote,
as well as the “Confirmation of our ancient Charter and all its
Rights and Priviledges.”84
Those in England who opposed renewing the charter—
Randolph as well as the Lords of Trade and William III’s Privy
Council—warned that to do so would court a resurrection of
the mint. Another battle over political sovereignty might soon
follow. One writer, for instance, anonymously complained that
“They Act as a Free and Independent Commonwealth.” As
proof, he remarked, “Now to show the unlimited Authority
82Journals of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 23 October 1686, Colonial Office,
391/6, pp. 19–27; Lords of Trade and Plantations to James II, 13 October 1686,
Colonial Office 5/904, p. 325; and Calendar of State Papers, vol. for 1685–88, pp. 257,
262.
83Edward Randolph to the Governor of Barbados, 16 May 1689, in Randolph,
Letters and Official Papers, 4:265–66.
84Instructions from Governor Simon Bradstreet to Massachusetts Agents, 24 January
1690, in The Andros Tracts: Being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers
Issued During the Period Between the Overthrow of the Andros Government and the
Establishment of the Second Charter of Massachusetts, ed. William H. Whitmore, 3
vols. (Boston: Prince Society, 1868–74), 3:60.
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they pretend to . . . 1. They took upon them to coyn Money in
the Name of the Commonwealth as they call it.”85
Flip-flopping yet again, Randolph reiterated his initial oppo-
sition to the mint in a May 1689 letter to the Lords of Trade.
Not only had the former government violated the royal prerog-
ative by “coining money without His Majesty’s permission,” he
wrote, but the overwhelming desire to reestablish the mint, he
contended, was among the five primary motivations that had
incited Bostonians to overturn Dominion rule in April 1689.
Randoph’s claim, of course, was patently absurd, but he was
correct in asserting that many colonists resented the mint’s clos-
ing. Randolph resumed his assault on the mint later that year,
this time in a letter to Parliament, wherein he listed “their as-
suming the Regal Power of Coyning” as one of several “weighty
considerations” for the revocation of the old charter in 1684.86
Reverend Increase Mather, now in London to lobby for a
reinstatement of the old charter, had no choice but to defend
the coinage. Not surprisingly, he concentrated on its economic
benefits. Given the irregularity in foreign money, he argued, a
mint in Boston was still advisable. On the prickly matter of the
royal prerogative, he insisted, there was no treason involved,
because “the Mint was set up in 1652, when there was no King
in England.” “As to what is objected about Coyning,” he contin-
ued, “many Goldsmiths in London can testifie, that the Money
coyned in New-England is as good as that of England.”87
King William III issued a new charter to Massachusetts Bay
in 1691. Though the new government was in significant ways
an improvement upon the Dominion regime—most important,
it allowed for a representative assembly—Massachusetts’ erst-
while autonomy would be severely constrained. The Crown
would henceforth appoint the governor of the new province,
and no coinage of any sort would be permitted therein.
85A Short Discourse Shewing the Great Inconveniences of Joyning the Plantation
Charters with those of England in the General Act of Restoration (London, 1689),
p. 2.
86Edward Randolph to the Parliament, 1689, in Randolph, Letters and Official
Papers, 5:12.
87Mather, New-England Vindicated, pp. 2–3.
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By 1691, however, the need for a mint was not so press-
ing as previously. Less than a year before the new charter
arrived, the colony adopted a paper currency, and the so-
called bills of credit effectively supplanted the pine-tree shilling
as the primary medium of exchange. The provisional govern-
ment authorized the first emission in the context of a 1690
land and naval expedition led by Sir William Phips against
the French at Quebec. The government, still awaiting news
of the charter, anticipated that the plunder secured during a
victorious attack would finance the expedition. News of the
intended invasion leaked, however, and reinforcements from
Montreal helped Quebec deliver Phips a crushing defeat. Phips
returned to Boston on 19 November, with the soldiers “upon
the point of Mutiny,” expecting their promised wages. Un-
able to borrow enough money in the immediate short term,
the colony issued paper bills of credit to secure the needed
funds.88
The December 1690 paper emission amounted to £7,000
face value. The smallest denomination was 5s, the largest £5,
and the bills measured 4 × 512 inches. On the face of the bill
were printed the words “shall be in value equal to money”
(fig. 3). Three months later, because its debts far exceeded
£7,000, the colony allowed the treasurer to print as many bills
as necessary. Not until May 1691 did the colony establish a limit
on the emission, in the amount of £40,000.89 In 1692 the bills
became legal tender for private debts, and further emissions
followed through the remainder of the 1690s and onward.90 For
the next sixty years, paper currency became perhaps the most
88Quotation from [Cotton Mather], Pietas in Patriam: The Life of His Excellency
Sir William Phips (London, 1697), p. 44.
89Andrew McFarland Davis, ed., Colonial Currency Reprints, 1682–1751, 4 vols.
(Boston: Prince Society, 1910–11), 1:23–27. See also Jennifer J. Baker, Securing the
Commonwealth: Debt, Speculation, and Writing in the Making of Early America (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 6–8 and 27–29; Elizabeth E. Dunn,
“ ‘Grasping at the Shadow’: The Massachusetts Currency Debate, 1690–1751,” New
England Quarterly, 71.1 (March 1998): 54–56; Bushman, King and People, p. 145; and
Bailyn, New England Merchants, pp. 188–89.
90The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts
Bay, 21 vols. (Boston, 1869–1922), 1:35–56.
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Fig. 3.—The original emission was printed, not handwritten, but the only surviving
copy of the 1690 bill of credit is the above pen-and-ink sketch. Reprinted from
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1st ser., vol. 6 (Boston, 1862–
63), p. 428. Image courtesy the Massachusetts Historical Society.
politically charged issue in the colony’s history. The former
mint was all but forgotten.
English officials, though spurning the Boston mint, accepted
paper bills of credit, at least at first, for three reasons. First,
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according to the conventional view, bills of credit were en-
tirely separate from money; therefore, they did not violate the
royal prerogative. Bills of credit, in this conception, were mere
certificates, promissory notes indicating that the colony was in
debt to the noteholder, who “redeemed” the notes by using
them in place of silver coin to pay taxes.91 Bills of credit were
“in value equal to money”; silver and gold, when coined, were
money. Second, England allowed—often even encouraged—
bills of credit when used by colonial governments to finance
wartime expeditions. This policy remained more or less intact
as late as the Seven Years War. Third, unlike the Bay shilling,
Massachusetts bills of credit acknowledged English authority:
on the lower left-hand corner of the bill were printed the royal
arms of England. Few in England at the time, moreover, could
possibly have imagined that the 1690 emission would usher in
a new era of North American currency. Not until the 1720s
and 1730s did the Crown pressure Massachusetts to curtail its
use.
Beyond the rise of paper currency, however, the demise
of the Boston mint can also be attributed to shifting polit-
ical realities following the Glorious Revolution. A Protestant
monarchy was firmly in place after 1688, one New Englan-
ders could fully embrace. Parliamentary supremacy now lim-
ited the king’s power, and no one harbored suspicions that
William and Mary were closet Papists. War against the Catholic,
absolutist French further helped unite New Englanders
behind the Protestant throne, and the sovereign heads of state
had graciously permitted representative assemblies to return to
Massachusetts. The English Crown offered its colonial subjects
protection in exchange for allegiance, and although the leaders
of Massachusetts would henceforth bicker and bargain over the
precise terms of this contract between “king” and “people”—as
91As Cotton Mather put it, “These Bills . . . did confess the Massachuset-Colony, to
be Endebted unto the Person, in whose Hands they were. . . . the Sailors and Souldiers
put off their Bills, instead of Money, to those, with whom they had any Dealing, and
they circulated through all the Hands in the Colony, pretty Comfortably” (Mather,
Pietas in Patriam, pp. 43–44).
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Richard Bushman calls it—there was no question that fealty to
England was an absolute necessity.92
In such a world, then, the Bay shilling was neither nec-
essary nor relevant. The economic justification had disap-
peared with the advent of paper currency, and the political
justification vanished with the new monarchical arrangement.
The General Court once feared the loss of all self-government
during the mint controversy, but that alarm had long since dis-
sipated. Under Stuart rule, radical Puritans and independence-
minded members of the General Court rejected the very
essence of the “protection-allegiance formula,” even going so
far as to challenge the king in his own courts. Allegiance in their
reigning triumvirate belonged first to God, second to New En-
gland, and third to England. The moderate faction, which rec-
ognized the efficacy of the protection-allegiance quid pro quo
even under the Stuarts, placed allegiance to the Crown before
allegiance to New England. With the accession of William and
Mary, the interests of radicals and moderates came into align-
ment, and both agreed, although in differing ways and to differ-
ing degrees, that the Protestant monarchy deserved allegiance
above New England. The political rationale for a sovereign
mint was thereby undermined, and no effort to restore the Bay
shilling of earlier fame was ever again made.93
In an 1857 article entitled, “The Coinage of Massachusetts,”
New England historian S. F. Haven remarked, “The subject
[of the mint] has never been treated with the respect or in-
terest it deserves.”94 The same might be said over a century
and a half later. Nevertheless, with the welcome rise of ma-
terial culture in the historiography, perhaps money will at-
tract attention once more, not only as a medium of central
92Bushman, King and People, p. 4.
93Bushman, King and People, pp. 24, 16, and Brendan McConville, The King’s
Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 7, 29–30, 40–41.
94Haven, “Coinage of Massachusetts,” pp. 281–82.
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economic importance but also as an artifact possessing multi-
faceted cultural and political meanings. Given those inherent
tensions, money has always been and ever will be a battle-
ground on which competing interests enact their conflicting
understandings.
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